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ABSTRACT
Reputation systems used in practice typically either provide
robustness or anonymity. A lot of research has been go-
ing on to come up with schemes that provide both proper-
ties, however most of them being too impractical. We come
up with an approach for a reputation system that provides
anonymity for users, meaning that ratings cannot be linked
to raters, but at the same time a rater’s identity can be dis-
closed in case a service is rated twice by a user—having the
permission to perform only a single rating. This is achieved
by making use of a group signature variant, whose proper-
ties are described in detail as well. Moreover, we aim to
make our system “lively” by introducing the concept of ex-
pert raters, which shall constitute an incentive for users to
actively participate in the reputation system by providing
ratings. We believe that this functionality is an important
one towards practicability.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information
Systems]: Security and Protection—Authentication, Unau-
thorized access; K.4.1 [Computers and Society]: Public
Policy Issues—Privacy
Keywords
Reputation Management, Privacy Protection, Anonymity
1. INTRODUCTION
A major difference between traditional business and elec-
tronic marketplaces is the way trust in transaction partners
is established. Electronic business is often conducted with
previously unknown entities. Assessing their trustworthi-
ness based on physical appearance is impossible, and word
of mouth is not usually available. Reputation systems fill
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that gap: transaction partners can rate each other, and as-
sess the respective trustworthiness based on (aggregates of)
others’ ratings. Unfortunately, reputation systems may con-
stitute a privacy risk, as the raters are usually identified—at
least under a pseudonym. Detailed profiles can be created
by anyone with access to the (non-aggregated) ratings.
As pseudonymous profiles can often be mapped to per-
sons, we aim at designing an anonymous reputation system:
Users can provide their ratings without having to reveal any
personally-identifying information, and it shall not be possi-
ble for any party to link ratings to transactions or ratings to
each other: unlinkability is achieved. Robustness is achieved
if it is not possible for any user to rate a transaction twice.
In our scenario, robustness means that if a user succeeds in
rating a transaction twice, he will get caught.
1.1 Contribution
Our contribution is to design an anonymous and robust
reputation system. These two requirements are contradic-
tory at first glance, but we show that by making use of group
signatures, both properties can be achieved at the same time.
Moreover, our reputation system provides support for raters
with different expertise—allowing users, when looking at the
reputation values, to place higher confidence in ratings by
experts, for example. Our system requires a group signa-
ture scheme with properties that are not fulfilled by current
schemes, but we provide evidence indicating such a system
can be constructed.
1.2 Paper Outline
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In
Section 2, we discuss preliminaries, like the cryptographic
building blocks to be used. Section 3 describes the abstract
model of our reputation system, while Section 4 deals with
the concrete concept. We evaluate our approach in Section 5
before comparing it with related work in Section 6. The
paper is concluded in Section 7.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Reputation Systems
Reputation systems provide information used to judge the
trustworthiness of (potential) transaction partners. If a sys-
tem simply exposed all ratings and the identities of the re-
spective raters, any user could decide for himself which rat-
ings to consider trustworthy, and how to aggregate them.
However, to achieve anonymity, some information must be
removed or aggregated by the system; it is an important
design decision which information can still be exposed. In
particular, we consider the rater’s experience (i.e. an indica-
tion about the number of previously rated transactions) as
a relevant criterion, which we make available to the users.
A number of issues have to be considered in reputation
systems that work either without identities, or with cheap
identities. Sybil attacks are a common problem, meaning
that one party appears under multiple identities to skew
aggregate ratings (also referred to as ballot stuffing, a term
originating from voting systems). This can be used both for
self-promoting and for slandering attacks. Whitewashing is
a related problem: A rated entity can create a new identity
so old, negative ratings can no longer be attributed to it.
For an extensive discussion of attacks on and defenses of
reputation systems, see Hoffman [11].
2.2 Cryptographic Building Blocks
In this section, we describe some of the cryptographic
building blocks used in our reputation system.
2.2.1 Partially Blind Signatures
Brands [4] introduces the concept of “restrictive blind
signatures”, in which not all the information is blinded, as
in other blind signature schemes, like e.g. the one by Chaum
et al. [5]. This property allows any verifier to derive some
additional information for verification.
Abe et al. [1] construct a method to “date” blind sig-
natures, which allows including arbitrary public data in a
blind signature. Signature schemes with that property are
commonly known as “partially blind signatures”.
The actual scheme that is used in this paper is due to
Chien et al. [7]. The scheme is based on RSA and requires
very low computational effort. To generate a signature, four
algorithms are executed by signer and signature requester.
The processes are as follows:
Initialization:
• The signer sets up public key (e, n) and private key
(d, n) according to the RSA scheme
• The signer publishes his public key and defines a secure
one-way hash function h to be used
Request:
• The requester selects the common information a to be
included in the signature for message m
• The requester chooses the blinding factors r and u ∈
Z∗n uniformly at random
• The requester sends (a, α) to the signer, where α =
reh(m)(u2 + 1) mod n
• The signer verifies a and responds with a random in-
teger x ≤ n
• Let r′ be an integer value chosen uniformly at random
and b = r · r′
• The requester computes β = be(u − x) mod n and
sends β to the signer
Signing:
• Upon receiving β, the signer computes t = h(a)d(α(x2+
1)β−2)2d mod n
• The blind signature (β−1, t) is sent back to the re-
quester
Extraction:
• The requester computes a valid signature with s =
t · r2 · r′4 mod n and c = (ux + 1) · β−1 · be = (ux +
1)(u− x)−1 mod m
The resulting signature can finally be verified by checking
whether the equation se = h(a)h(m)2(c2+1)2 mod n holds.
2.2.2 Group Signatures
Group signatures were introduced by Chaum et al. [6].
Those schemes allow an arbitrary member of a group to
anonymously sign messages on behalf of the group. In a
first step, the group members need to enroll with a dedicated
trusted group manager. The group manager decides whether
the new member is allowed to join the group and issues a
private group signing key for the new member. It is also
the group manager who is able to revoke the anonymity of a
single group member by exposing him as the one responsible
for a particular signature. Group signatures do not only
provide unlinkability of signatures to their authors, but also
guarantee unlinkability of two different signatures.
Boneh et al. [3] present a group signature scheme based
on bilinear maps, which allows for very short signatures and
low computational effort for signature verification. Boneh
et al. also discuss revocation mechanisms and conclude
that ideally, only a broadcast to all signature verifiers is
needed. Their proposed signature scheme also provides that
functionality, which is called verifier-local-revocation (VLR).
However, the revocation mechanism leads to a computa-
tional cost, increasing linear with the number of revoked
group members.
2.2.3 Ring Signatures and One-more Unforgeability
Ring signatures provide similar properties to group signa-
tures, without the requirement for a group manager. Thus,
there is no functionality for anonymity revocation. A ring
signature can be computed by any member of a group of
users if the public keys of all the group members are accessi-
ble beforehand. It is not possible to link any group member
to a concrete signature, thus, the determination of a signer
of a message is not possible. There exist a number of ring
signature schemes in the literature.
The ring signature scheme by Fujisaki et al. [10] pro-
vides an interesting property, which is also required in the
group signature scheme used in the paper at hand. They
propose the concept of traceable ring signatures. For that
purpose, “tags” are introduced for every signed message. A
tag T = (t, pKN) consists of a tag name t and the total set of
public keys of all ring members pKN . Every ring member
can sign messages with his respective private key, includ-
ing a tag T ′ with an arbitrary tag name. Messages can be
verified with respect to the included tag, while the identity
of the signer remains private as usual for any kind of ring
signature. The distinct property of the traceable signature
scheme are two distinguishable attributes provided:
• Every two signatures with the same tag but different
messages can be traced by any verifier with only knowl-
edge of both messages, both signatures and the com-
mon tag (public traceability)
• Every two signatures generated by a single signer and
including the same tag are linked (tag-linkability)
The second property ensures the so-called “one-more un-
forgeability”, as no tag can be used more than once by any
ring member for different messages without making the mul-
tiple usage visible to any verifier.1
2.2.4 One-more Unforgeability for Group Signatures
As of today, there exist no group signature schemes with
attributes comparable to those of ring signature schemes as
discussed above.
However, Damg˚ard et al. [8] present a group signature
variant which provides one-more unforgeability. The scheme
relies on zero-knowledge proofs [9] performed for every signa-
ture that a group member generates. Like the traceable ring
signature, it can expose the identity of members who sign
two different messages with a respective value α. This value
can be considered equivalent to the tags discussed before.
However, the signature generation requires communication
with the group manager. Setting the parameters so that the
scheme offers “reasonable” security, the total amount of data
exchanged between the group manager and a group member
for signature generation sums up to about 130 Kilobytes.
3. SYSTEM MODEL
Our proposed reputation system comprises of the follow-
ing entities:
• Reputation provider which stores the users’ ratings
and provides the service providers’ reputation values
to users
• Service providers which are rated by users
• Users who rate service providers and retrieve service
providers’ reputation values
• Group manager which is responsible for registering the
users who use the group signature scheme
• Prestige manager which is responsible for managing
the users’ “prestiges”, i.e. the users’ expertise levels
Users rate service providers—not services/transactions—
after having performed a transaction with them.
3.1 Requirements
The requirements to our system can be classified into the
following categories.
3.1.1 Liveliness
Liveliness is a very important requirement in reputation
systems—neglect often leading to reputation systems that
pose no practical advantage as ratings are spare and, thus,
reputation values simply not being available or not signifi-
cant. This is the reason why we strive for a mechanism that
rewards users who provide a rating for a completed trans-
action. Liveliness is achieved if the following properties are
met:
1“The total number of signatures with respect to the same
tag cannot exceed the total number of ring members in the
tag, if every any two signatures are not linked.” [10]
• Rating Incentive: The system shall offer a rating in-
centive for users in order to maintain a high level of
ratings.
• Quick Rating: Prompt acquisition of recent ratings in
order to have up-to-date reputation values and to avoid
negative ratings by users after the time for complaints
has passed.
• Reflection of up-to-date State: The service provider’s
reputation value must not show a high inertia if the
average ratings drop quickly.
The incentive for providing ratings in our scenario is sup-
posed to be achieved by a mechanism that shall allow users
to excel, i.e. to gain “prestige” by submitting ratings and
become an “expert rater” at some point of time. Expert
raters’ ratings, on the other hand, may be valued more by
other users as they can assume that those expert raters—
who have performed a lot of transactions already—know
better how to assess transactions (service providers) and,
thus, rating them more accurately than others could do.
The requirement for expert ratings can also be found in the
literature [12].
Moreover, many reputation systems—especially those that
provide privacy by not revealing individual ratings but only
an aggregated reputation value—face the problem that they
do not adapt well to new situations. For example, if a service
provider delivered good quality over a long period of time,
his reputation value was, let us assume, good. However, at
a certain point of time, the service provider decides to just
deliver bad quality from now on, resulting in, let us assume,
bad ratings. However, those (current) bad ratings might not
have a strong impact in some reputation systems as only the
aggregation over all—including the many good—ratings is
made available as reputation value. We thus strive for a
reputation system that does not have this problem.
3.1.2 Security
If ratings for service providers were to be submitted by ar-
bitrary users—even those not having dealt with the service
providers—, those ratings, and the reputation values based
upon them, would be meaningless. Moreover, legitimate rat-
ings and reputation values should not be alterable by any
party. Security is achieved if the following sub-requirements
are met:
• Authorization: Only after having performed a trans-
action with a service provider, a user shall be able to
rate that service provider
• Integrity: No ratings may be altered during transmis-
sion or while being stored at the reputation provider
3.1.3 Privacy
The main motivation for users’ privacy to be adhered to
in a reputation system is that users are expected to rate
more honestly—and, rate at all. Users might not rate ser-
vice providers that provide products they do not want to be
connected to by other users, and, thus, would not use a rep-
utation system that relies on identification during ratings.
Privacy is achieved if the following protection goals are met:
• Anonymous Rating: Users shall be able to transmit
their ratings to the reputation provider without reveal-
ing any personally-identifiable information. For that
purpose, the following unlinkability guarantees need
to be met:
– Unlinkability of ratings to transactions
– Unlinkability of raters to transactions
– Unlinkability of any two or more ratings
3.2 Assumptions
A reliable reputation system is based on the authenticity
of its users’ identities. In consequence, such a system re-
quires sufficient cost for users’ identities. We thus assume,
that an entity already exists that can verify the identity of
any user. Furthermore, we assume that a public key in-
frastructure (PKI) is accessible and all users hold verifiable
credentials or can obtain them at any time, providing their
verified identity. Acquisition of those credentials is assumed
to impose sufficiently high cost for all users in order to pre-
vent Sybil attacks.
In order for users to stay fully anonymous, communication
anonymity also needs to be given. Therefore, we assume
users to connect to the reputation system through mecha-
nisms such as Tor.
Communication channel security (i.e. secrecy, integrity,
and authenticity) is assumed to be given by using standard
mechanisms such as TLS.
Moreover, we assume a group signature scheme with one-
more unforgeability that provides the following properties:
• After enrollment at the group manager, the generation
of a group signature can be done individually by every
group member without depending on any other entity.
• The group manager can trace any signature and reveal
the identity of the signer.
• Every group signature contains a tag T , with T being
an arbitrary value.
• Every two signatures generated with a single group
member’s secret key and including the same tag are
linked (one-more unforgeability).
• The signature scheme is fully dynamic, allowing users
to join the group at any time after initializing and
providing a method for member revocation.
• The signature scheme offers verifier-local-revocation [3]
with a logarithmic or better correlation between the
number of revoked group members and computational
cost for verification.
3.3 Definition of Security and Privacy
We assume that there is no single trusted third party
(TTP) that keeps track of reputation information, i.e. par-
ticularly the reputation provider is not a TTP. The reputa-
tion provider is modeled as a malicious adversary that might
deviate from the protocol specification.
The reputation provider must not learn the real identity
of the user submitting a rating—unless the user rates the
same service provider twice.
Furthermore, the reputation provider shall not be able to
manipulate any ratings, i.e. not publish them when provid-
ing reputation values.
The service providers shall not learn which users provided
ratings for their services. If there is only a small number of
users who performed a transaction (and, thus, a small num-
ber of ratings), the service provider shall not learn those
ratings as it would allow drawing conclusions about which
user rendered in a certain rating—especially if the user re-
veals his real identity for the transaction, e.g. for orderings
of physical goods.
4. CONCEPT
The use cases of the system are shown in Fig. 4. The
individual phases of the overall system are described next in
more detail.
5. System Design
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Figure 5.1.: Use cases of the reputation system
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Figure 1: Use cases of the proposed reputation sys-
tem
4.1 Setup Prestige
The prestige manager sets the users’ initial amount of
prestige prestigeinit, as well as a value prestigeadd by which
the user’s prestige is incremented for every rating he sub-
mits. Then the prestige levels Prestige1, . . . , P restigek are
defined and a trusted group manager is selected to initialize
the groups g1, . . . , gk with group IDs denoted byG1, . . . , Gk—
corresponding to the prestige levels. After the group gener-
ation is completed, the prestige manager generates a private
key pmpriv and the corresponding public key pmpub, which
is then forwarded to the group manager. This key is needed
to verify the partially blind signed token, which every user
needs to provide for enrollment at the group manager.
To allow for a promotion of the users during the opera-
tional period, a threshold vector Vthreshold = (v1, . . . , vk) is
generated—k equaling the total number of groups generated
before. A user’s amount of prestige prestigeu needs to be
greater or equal to vi in order to be promoted to group Gi.
4.2 Setup Reputation Provider
In the first step, the reputation provider needs to select
the desired prestige manager. As rating aggregation can
be dependent on the prestige levels specified by the pres-
tige manager, aggregation functions should be defined at
this point. Moreover, the structure of ratings to be ac-
cepted needs to be published—in order to be accessible for
everyone—beforehand as well. For arbitrary ratings, a gen-
eral structure in form of a vector Rtr can be assumed. The
number of ratings C that are collected before publishing
them—as reputation value—, is also set.
Finally, the reputation provider generates a private key
rppriv and the corresponding public key rppub, which is for-
warded to the prestige manager with a request for registra-
tion. If the prestige manager accepts the request, the system
is ready to accept ratings.
4.3 Register Service Provider
The service provider generates a private key sppriv and
the corresponding public key sppub, which is forwarded to
the reputation provider. If the service provider agrees to the
processing and sharing of its reputation value, the reputation
provider issues an ID IDsp and a token-time
2 TTsp to the
service provider.
4.4 Register User
While users are not required to register at the reputation
provider, a registration at the prestige manager is required.
This registration can be performed without exposing users’
identities. The goal of registering at the prestige manager
is to gain credentials that allow the reputation provider to
identify the respective user’s level of prestige and prevent
providing ratings several times.
In the first step, the user generates his private key upriv
and the corresponding public key upub, which he forwards
to the prestige manager. The prestige manager generates a
new account au with initial prestige prestigeinit and stores
the received public key upub associated with that account.
Then the prestige manager forwards the user’s new account
number Au and the prestige manager’s public key pmpub.
The user then acquires a partially blind signature for a
random token Tru. This process, which provides no knowl-
edge of Tru to the signer but reveals the ID G1 of the ini-
tial group as part of the signature, works as follows. The
user computes the hash value h(Tru) and blinds the value
with the received public key pmpub to get h(Tru)
∗. This
result is sent to the prestige manager who returns a blind
signature σpm(h(Tru)
∗, G1) for h(Tru)∗ with the group ID
as public information. The user then unblinds the result to
obtain a valid signature including the ID of the initial group.
(Tru, G1)
′ denotes the signed value of Tru.
4.5 Enroll User
Every user needs to become a member of one of the groups
generated during the setup of the reputation provider be-
fore being able to submit ratings. To obtain membership
of a group, the user needs to submit his credentials to the
group manager. If the group manager accepts the creden-
tials, he first checks whether the user has already enrolled
before. If that is not the case, the group manager asks the
user for the token (Tru, G1)
′, which has been blindly signed
by the prestige manager during the registration process. As
described previously, (Tru, G1)
′ includes the ID of the ini-
tial group g1. This informs the group manager about the
group the respective user is supposed to enroll in. The user
provides that token and the group manager then checks the
received signature for validity. If it is valid, the list of all
previously used tokens is searched for the user’s token. In
2Token-time means that the token includes a time-stamp.
case it has not been used before, it is added to the list. The
user’s credentials are then stored and the user is enrolled.
At the end of this process, the group manager issues a
valid group secret key GSKu to the user. The user stores
all information, as they will be used later on when he wants
to enroll in another group.
4.6 Request Reputation
Any user can request service providers’ reputation values,
by asking the reputation provider for the reputation value
of the service provider with ID IDsp. The user can specify
the exact reputation information desired. It can either be
the total amount of ratings Rtotal(IDsp, (tbegin, tend)) over
a period of time (tbegin, tend) or any form of aggregated data
Ragg(s, (tbegin, tend)) which the reputation provider is will-
ing to provide for some respective period.
Given the possibility to access all “raw” ratings, any user
is thus able to verify the contained signatures and to decide
whether a concrete reputation value is trustworthy.
4.7 Perform Transaction
Any transactions between users and service provider are
supported by our reputation system. Before processing any
payment for the transaction, though, the service provider
needs to supply the user with its public key sppub and the
user asks for a (blindly) signed token, which works as follows.
The user generates a random token Tr. Then he computes
its hash value h(Tr) and blinds the result using the seller’s
public key sppub to receive a partially blind signature for the
resulting value h(Tr)
∗ once again. The common information
is the service provider’s public token-time TTsp. The user
forwards h(Tr)
∗ to the service provider who responds with
the desired blind signature σsp(h(Tr)
∗, TTsp). The user un-
blinds the received signature and eventually holds the signed
value (Tr, TTsp)
′ for his random token generated before. If
the signature passes verification, the user processes the re-
quired payment and the transaction is carried out.
4.8 Submit Rating
As covered above, users are granted with a signed ran-
dom token (Tr, TTsp)
′ of their own choice during transac-
tions, which entitles them to submit ratings to the reputa-
tion provider and, furthermore, increase their prestige after
submission. Moreover, as we have seen, the user is in pos-
session of a valid group secret key GSKu for the group Gu,
where Gu denotes the group the user is enrolled in.
To submit a rating to the reputation provider, the user
sends his token (Tr, TTsp)
′ first. The signature of the token
is verified and the token is checked for double-spending. If
the token is not found on the list of all previously submitted
tokens, the token is added to the list. Moreover, the repu-
tation provider checks whether the service provider’s token-
time is still valid. Let TT ′sp be the service provider’s current
token-time. If TT ′sp ≥ TTsp + 1 holds, the token’s lifetime
has expired and, thus, the token is rejected. Otherwise, the
reputation provider acknowledges the token’s validity and
requests for the user’s rating.
The user generates a rating vector Rtr. He signs Rtr us-
ing his group secret key GSKu and the required tag IDsp,
giving the signed value (Rtr, IDsp)
′. Note that IDsp is the
respective service provider’s public ID. (Rtr, IDsp)
′ is then
transmitted together with the user’s group ID Gu.
The reputation provider checks the validity of the group
signature for the claimed group gu. If the signature is valid,
the rating is accepted. Given the group signature scheme’s
property of one-more unforgeability, any two vectors of dif-
ferent ratings which are signed with a single user’s key are
inevitably linked. The set of received ratings is therefore
searched for any linked values. If some linked ratings are
found, the current process is aborted. Otherwise, the rep-
utation provider adds (Rtr, IDsp)
′, Gu, (Tr, TTsp)′ as one
element to the set Wsp, denoting the ratings accumulated
for service provider IDsp and waiting for disclosure. If the
amount of tokens with token-time TT ′sp exceeds C, TT
′
sp is
increased by one. All ratings with token-time TTsp 6= TT ′sp
are released in random order, if Wsp contains more than C
elements. This data then reveals the particular signed rat-
ings, i.e. the reputation value, the associated users’ levels of
prestige and the users’ authorization for ratings.
To reward the user for his rating submission, the reputa-
tion provider transmits his public key rppub to the user and
the user once again generates a token, which will be (blindly)
signed by the reputation provider—this token can then be
presented to the prestige manager to get an increased pres-
tige. This process works as follows. The user acquires a
partially blind signature with his group ID Gu, denoting his
current prestige level. The user generates a random token
Tp, computes the hash value h(Tp) and blinds the result us-
ing the reputation provider’s public key rppub. The resulting
value h(Tp)
∗ is transmitted to the reputation provider who
responds with the desired blind signature σrp(h(T
∗
p , Gu).
The user unblinds the received signature to get the signed
value (Tp, Gu)
′ of his token Tp, with his prestige level in-
cluded in the signature. The token is verified by the user.
4.9 Update Prestige
The partially blind token (Tp, Gu)
′, received during the
rating submission, entitles the user to increase his prestige
at the prestige manager. Therefore, the user signs in to his
account au at the prestige manager and submits the token.
The prestige manager verifies the validity of the signature
and the group index Gu. If the check succeeds, the user’s
current prestige value prestigeu is increased by prestigeadd
and the new value is returned.
The prestige value offers promotion to a higher prestige
level. Thus, after incrementation, it is checked whether the
value reaches a certain threshold. If that is the case, the
user is promoted to the next level. Let prestigeu be the
user’s current prestige level. The respective threshold for
promotion to the next level is then given by vu+1, defined in
the threshold vector Vthreshold. Thus, if vu+1 ≤ prestigeu,
the user is promoted. As the prestige level is associated to
the user’s group membership, switching the group is required
as well.
To switch the group, a partially blind signature is gener-
ated. The common information contained in the signature
is a vector α = (Gu, Gnew). It contains the IDs of the user’s
current and future group.
A random token Tpromotion is generated by the user who
then computes its hash value h(Tpromotion) and blinds the
result using the prestige manager’s public key pmpub. The
blinded value h(Tpromotion)
∗ is transmitted to the prestige
manager. The prestige manager computes the blind signa-
ture σpm(h(Tpromotion)
∗, α) and forwards it to the user. The
user unblinds the received signature to get the signed value
(Tpromotion, α)
′ of his token Tpromotion.
4.10 Switch Group
To switch to a group representing a higher prestige level, a
user has to contact the group manager. The user transmits
his credentials provided for enrollment before and the group
manager verifies them. If the verification succeeds, the group
manager asks for a token, authorizing the switch to another
group. The user sends his signed token (Tpromotion, α)
′,
which is verified by the group manager. As α = (Gu, Gnew)
defines the group member’s claimed current group, the group
manager can verify this information against his own data.
If the token matches and cannot be found in the list of pre-
viously submitted tokens, the group manager revokes the
user’s current group secret key GSKu and informs the rep-
utation provider to update his revocation list. The user is
then enrolled in the group corresponding to his new prestige
level and (Tpromotion, α)
′ is added to the list of previously
used tokens. Transmission of the user’s new group secret
key GSK′u finishes the procedure.
5. EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
In this section we check whether the requirements as stated
in Sect. 3.1 are met. We begin with the general require-
ments to the reputation system in terms of functionality and
then show that the proposed concept is secure and privacy-
preserving.
5.1 Liveliness
In comparison to related work on privacy-preserving rep-
utation systems, our proposed concept also puts a focus on
the liveliness of the reputation system, i.e. that the reputa-
tion system is actively used by users.
5.1.1 Rating Incentive
In reputation systems used nowadays, users do not have
any direct incentive to provide ratings: it costs time to pro-
vide a rating but it helps only other users. However, a rep-
utation system with a high number of ratings is more reli-
able, i.e. the reputation value is more accurate. This is why
we have introduced what we call “prestige” in our concept.
The prestige levels of users increases with all submitted rat-
ings. Users thus get the chance to ascent and become “ex-
pert raters”, which means that they are more appreciated by
other users. At the same time, users are not able to cheat,
as we will cover in the security analysis: ratings can only
be provided if transactions actually took place. Thus, we
believe that our approach of introducing prestige provides a
good way of rating incentive and will make our reputation
system “livelier”.
5.1.2 Quick Rating
As we have shown in our concept description, ratings can
only be transmitted for a certain period of time after a
transaction has taken place. This approach protects ser-
vices providers from being threatened by users long after
the transaction. If users were able to provide a rating even
after a long time, the rating could serve as some sort of
“insurance” for the user: If the user is not happy with the
product any longer after one year, for example, he could sim-
ply demand his money for the product back and threaten to
provide a very bad feedback if the service provider does not
comply with the demand. Especially in a reputation system
where individual ratings have a high impact on the reputa-
tion value, a service provider would not take that risk of not
complying with the users’ demands.
5.1.3 Reflection of up-to-date State
Inertia is a property that most anonymous reputation sys-
tems struggle with. The reason for that lies in the trade-
off between anonymity by hiding in an anonymity set and
quick provision of reputation values. With the size of the
anonymity set in the proposed concept set to C, there is a
lower bound imposed for the reputation’s inertia. Except
for this, there is no additional delay as ratings can also be
accessed individually, i.e. as “raw data”, which will quickly
show rapid reputation changes—e.g., if the service provider
starts to deliver only bad quality from a certain point of
time on.
5.2 Security Analysis
Our proposed reputation system conforms to the security
requirements that hold for most reputation systems in use
today as well.
5.2.1 Authorization
As we have seen, users get supplied with an authorization
token that entitles for the submission of a rating during the
transaction from the service provider. Only users in posses-
sion of such tokens are able to rate a service provider—only
once. The communication channels provide confidentiality.
Thus, the reputation provider is the only entity, besides the
user, which gets access to the token. In theory, the reputa-
tion provider would be the only entity that could“steal” that
token from the user and use it to submit a rating with the
user’s prestige. However, the user would immediately iden-
tify such fraudulent behavior as all ratings are made public.
Furthermore, the user can prove ownership by revealing the
blinding factor used for acquisition of the signature.
5.2.2 Integrity
Integrity of ratings and, thus, reputation values, is pro-
vided on two levels. First, all ratings are publicly accessi-
ble and therefore verifiable (by the raters themselves). Sec-
ondly, integrity is based on the unforgeability property of the
underlying group signature scheme: Generation of a valid
signature for altered ratings is computationally infeasible.
Thus, no ratings can be altered without invalidating the
group signature.
5.3 Privacy Analysis
Privacy protection is a fundamental requirement for repu-
tation systems to provide users the possibility to rate trans-
actions/service providers they would otherwise not do, as
we have argued.
In contrast to reputation systems used in practice, and
also related work in this field, we argue that the sole use
of pseudonyms is not enough for users to stay anonymous.
It has been shown that profiles under a pseudonym can be
de-anonymized, for example. Thus, we required fully anony-
mous ratings that are unlinkable to each other in Sect. 3.1.
5.3.1 Anonymous Rating
Recapitulating the rating transmission presented in Sect. 4,
we can see that a distinct set of data is transferred to the
reputation provider: ((Rtr, IDsp)
′, Gu, (Tr, TTsp)′). As this
set is eventually, i.e. after publishing as reputation value,
visible to everyone, an adversary with cumulative knowledge
must be considered to protect against.
It is to be shown now, that
• unlinkability of ratings to transactions
• unlinkability of raters to transactions
• unlinkability of any two or more ratings
is given. Therefore, let us look at the data an attacker knows
in detail. The rating itself, Rtr, does not allow the attacker
a linkage to a transaction or a rater. In theory, it might
be possible for the service provider to link a bad feedback
to a bad quality service provided—given, the bad service
was provided only once. However, no “meaningful” informa-
tion can be derived from that in practice. Every reputation
system is prone to that very theoretic attack. The service
provider’s ID, IDsp, does not provide any information for
linkage either. With Gu derivable from the group signature,
there is only the group signature itself to come into consid-
eration, though any information gained here would invali-
date the respective cryptographic assumptions. The pres-
tige manager might try to arbitrarily promote a target user
to a unique group, but in practice, this will catch the group
manager’s attention. The blindly signed token, (Tr, TTsp)
′,
does not reveal anything apart from the token-time TTsp.
This is assumed to hold due to the proven security of the
blind signature scheme. The only entity with knowledge of
the transaction is the service provider. As the blindly signed
token reveals no data to the service provider, the token-time
is the only hint on the underlying transaction. Since the rep-
utation provider is not disclosing any rating before there are
at least C values for a single token-time, this results in an
anonymity set with C elements. Moreover, as group signa-
tures are unlinkable to each other—as long as they do not
contain the same tag—ratings are unlinkable to each other
as well, and, thus, no profile under a pseudonym can be
built. To sum it up, if users use an anonymization network
such as Tor, as assumed in this paper, users can stay fully
anonymous when using our proposed reputation system.
6. RELATED WORK
Androulaki et al. [2] propose a reputation system con-
cept offering anonymous ratings. However, there is no di-
rect mechanism for rating authorization. In addition, their
design does not provide full robustness against collaborat-
ing attackers, assuming that they never share private keys.
Schiffner et al. [15] added rating authorization in their
approach, but they do not consider ballot-stuffing, as their
concept can only rely on a general fee for payment processing
to repel fake transactions.
Kerschbaum [13] presents a reputation system that pro-
vides anonymity in the virtual organization formation sce-
nario. Ratings are coupled to transactions and transaction
partners can rate each other. In his approach, there are two
(centralized) mutually mistrusting reputation providers RP1
and RP2 with different tasks. To rate a transaction partner,
a user encrypts his rating and sends it to RP1. RP1 collects a
number of individual ratings before posting them in a block
to a bulletin board. RP2 takes the ratings from the bulletin
board, decrypts and aggregates them and provides them for
retrieval. The scheme is based on the homomorphic Pail-
lier cryptosystem. The usage of two reputation providers
guarantees the unlinkability of rating users and ratings. By
using the bulletin board, unlinkability between ratings and
transactions is achieved. Petrlic et al. [14] show that a
reputation system based on homomorphic encryption is also
possible by making use of only a single reputation provider—
which does not need to be fully trusted. However, a draw-
back of approaches based on homomorphic aggregation is
that arbitrary ratings are not supported. Moreover, the sys-
tems do not provide robustness against ballot-stuffing either.
7. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In this paper we have made several contributions. We
came up with a proposal for a reputation system that com-
bines security, privacy, and liveliness. In our reputation
system, only users who are authorized to rate transactions
can do that—at the same time, users stay anonymous during
those ratings, i.e. no party can link a rating to an individ-
ual user. By making use of a group signature scheme with
the one-more unforgeability property, it is possible to detect
fraudulent users, i.e. those users who provide several ratings
for a transaction they are entitled to rate only once. This
ensures robustness of our reputation system as users can
not rate arbitrary transactions they have not performed—
as it is the case for other reputation systems. Moreover,
our proposed reputation system also guarantees liveliness.
That said, users have an incentive to actively participate in
our reputation system. For every rating users provide, their
“prestige”, i.e. their level of expertise, increases. Active
raters can thus become “expert raters”, which means that
they are more appreciated by other users at the end. Other
users, in turn, can put more value to ratings provided by ex-
pert raters if they want. This is made possible because the
reputation value that is retrieved is made up of individual
ratings that can be retrieved—which is different to privacy-
preserving reputation system approaches in the literature.
In other approaches, only an aggregation of ratings can be
retrieved.
For future work, it would be interesting to see more re-
search on group signature schemes that provide one-more
unforgeability.
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